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Abstract— We consider the problem of false data injection
attacks modeled as additive disturbances in various parts of a
general LTI feedback system and derive necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence of stealthy unbounded attacks. We
also consider the problem of characterizing the worst, bounded
and stealthy attacks. This problem involves a maximization of
a convex function subject to convex constraints, and hence,
in principle, it is not easy to solve. However, by employing a
`∞ framework, we show how tractable Linear Programming
(LP) methods can be used to obtain the worst attack design.
Moreover, we provide a controller synthesis iterative method to
minimize the worst impact of such attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Advancements in communication, sensing and computing
technologies allowed the control of physical systems or
plants to be implemented over networks (cyber space), lead-
ing to the creation of “cyber-physical” systems. Such systems
are found in many applications including the smart grid
and vehicle control units. However, the interaction between
cyber systems and physical systems introduced security
challenges that can be exploited by malicious agents. It has
been shown through real world incidents and research paper
simulations that stealthy attacks can be carefully designed
to cause significant damage in control systems. Therefore,
it is very important to research the security vulnerabilities
of cyber-physical systems, and find solutions that guarantee
the stability and resiliency of control systems under different
attack scenarios.
Recent work on security of cyber-physical systems from
a control-theoretic perspective has been focused on the
characterization of feasible attacks and proposing ways for
detection and/or improving the resiliency of the control
system subject to such attacks. The type of attacks studied
can be generally split into two categories: static attacks
(attacks that do not take into account the dynamics of
the system and/or do not affect the states of the system
directly) or dynamic attacks. Attacks under each category
can be classified as stealthy or not stealthy depending on
the assumptions and the detection methods used. Examples
of static attacks include attacks on the power system state
estimators [1], where a carefully designed bias can be added
to the sensor measurements without being detected by the
commonly used statistical detection methods. Another work
on static attacks is by [2] and [3] where they showed that
the states of the system cannot be accurately reconstructed
if half of the sensors are attacked. Both papers propose
computationally intensive methods to reconstruct the states
when less than half of the sensors are attacked. Their work
was extended by [4] where the authors provide a framework
to to reconstruct the states that is robust to additive and
multiplicative errors. On the other hand, research work
related to dynamic attacks include [5] where the authors
provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence
of unbounded stealthy actuator and/or sensor attacks. In
addition they proposed dual rate control to detect unbounded
stealthy actuator attacks (zero dynamics attacks). In [6] the
authors inject a random signal (unknown to the attacker)
into the system to detect replay attacks at the expense of
increasing the cost of the LQG controller. In [7] the case
for finding the worst bias constant (steady state) attack
has been considered and a tractable procedure to compute
it has been developed where the energy of the detection
signal was considered as a measure of stealthiness. In [8]
coordinated actuator and sensor attacks are computed that
create unbounded expectation of the estimation error while
keeping the residual of the KF detector bounded. In [9]
optimal attacks are computed on a LQG systems that mini-
mize the K-L divergence between the true and falsified state
estimates such that the attack impact is above a specified
a limit, showing that the optimal attacks are additive white
noise. In [10] optimal actuator attacks are designed using the
minimum principle that maximizes a quadratic cost related to
the error between the healthy (un-attacked) system and the
attacked system while minimizing the attack cost, without
including any stealthiness requirement.
In this work, we consider signal attacks where the general
problem from the attacker’s perspective is to find the attack
input d = {d(k)} so that it is stealthy while inflicting the
maximum damage on the performance variable z = {z(k)}.
We showed in our previous work [5] that unbounded attacks
for LTI systems are related to the unstable zeros and/or poles
of the open loop system. However, in this paper we consider
the problem of characterizing the worst, bounded and stealthy
attacks. This problem involves a maximization of a convex
function subject to convex constraints. We propose different
attack resource constraints to make the problem more prac-
tical. More specifically, we assume that the attacker has a
finite time window {0, 1, . . . , ta} to attack the system and
inflict the maximum damage before the attack is over, and
we attempt to solve the following three attack scenarios:
Scenario 1 : Attacker can attack in a finite time window
up to t = ta, his goal is to inflict the maximum damage
anywhere (before or after ta) while remaining stealthy for
all t.
Scenario 2 : Attacker can attack in a finite interval up to
t = ta, his goal is to inflict the maximum damage anywhere
(before or after ta) while remaining stealthy for t ≤ ta (does
not care if detected after the attack is over).
Scenario 3 : Attacker can attack in a finite interval up to
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t = ta, his goal is to inflict the maximum damage at t ≤ ta
while remaining stealthy for t ≤ ta.
We show that by employing a `∞ framework, tractable
Linear Programming (LP) methods can be used to compute
the worst attack for the above three scenarios. Our work is
closely related to [7], [8] and [9]. However, we don’t assume
a constant d such as in [7] where they assume the system is
in steady state. In addition, the work in [8] and [9] relate to
either a specific detection method (e.g. residual detectors) or
to a specific controller in use. We plan to investigate these
problems in a more general input-output fashion that does
not depend on the particular controller used.
In the second part of this paper, we build on the worst
attack design problem and provide a K-d controller synthesis
iterative method to minimize the performance cost without
increasing the impact of the worst attack. Each iteration is
a LP and alternates between finding the worst attack d for a
given controller K, and finding the next K that minimizes
the performance cost while keeping a non-increasing upper
bound on the worst case impact inflicted by d.
Some standard notation we use is as follows: Z+, Rn,
Cn and Rn×m denote the sets of non-negative integers, n-
dimensional real vectors, n-dimensional complex vectors and
n×m dimensional real matrices, respectively. For any Rn or
Cn vector x we denote x′ its transpose and |x| := maxi
√
x2i
where x′ = [x1, x2, ..., xn]; for a sequence of real n-
dimensional vectors, x = {x(k)}k∈Z+ we denote ||x||∞ :=
supk |x(k)|; for a sequence of real n × m dimensional
real matrices G = {Gk}k∈Z+ we denote its z-transform
G(z) :=
∑∞
k=0Gkz
−k; and if viewed as the pulse response
of the LTI system G then ||G||1 = sup||x||∞≤1 ||Gx||∞.
Finally, we will call system G “tall” when y = Gu and
the dimension of the output vector y is at least equal to the
dimension of the input u; otherwise we will call G “fat”. We
will also be using the standard notions for zeros and coprime
factorizations of a LTI system G (e.g., [11], [12], [13].)
II. PROBLEM SETUP
We consider the case of a general signal attack d on a
closed loop system of Figure 1. Let Φ(K) describe the effect
of d on the performance variable z and on the monitoring
signal ψ, i.e. let Φ =
[
Φzd
Φψd
]
=: d 7→
[
z
ψ
]
. The monitoring
signal ψ consists of the measured output y and the control
signal u; it can however contain any other information that is
recorded and measured, e.g., reference inputs. In this setup,
we assume that there may be other external disturbances and
noise inputs which are “normal”, i.e., not malicious attackers,
which are not shown in the figure. Also, all the formulation
deals with discrete-time systems and signals.
The attacker’s goal can be stated in general as
max
d
‖z‖∞
s.t. ‖ψ‖∞ ≤ θ,
(1)
where θ is an alarm threshold, associated with the afore men-
tioned normal set of disturbances. In our previous work [5],
we established exact conditions for stealthiness of unbounded
Fig. 1: General setup of input-output maps.
actuator and sensor attacks which can totally destroy the
system. These attacks are ultimately related to the open
loop plant P , and for LTI systems in particular, to the non-
minimum phase (unstable) zeros and unstable poles of P .
We note, as pointed in [5], that unstable zeros can also be
due to the sampled data implementation of controllers.
In this general setup of Figure 1, we elaborate on the
existence of stealthy unbounded attacks using an input-
output approach. In particular, considering a left coprime
factorization ([11], [12], [13]) for the part of the generalized
system that connects inputs to the measured output y =
Pydd+ Pu in the open loop, we have
[Pyd P ] = M˜
−1[N˜yd N˜ ]
Using a left coprime factorization for the stabilizing con-
troller K = Y X−1 we can express
ψ =
[
y
u
]
=
[
X
Y
]
W−1M˜Pydd =
[
X
Y
]
W−1N˜ydd.
where W = M˜X− N˜Y . Since W is stable and, by stability
of the closed loop, has a stable inverse W−1 we have that
the detectability of d depends on the unstable zeros of N˜yd:
unbounded stealthy attacks d are possible if and only if N˜yd
has unstable zeros.
For actuator only attacks
Pyd = P = M˜
−1N˜ =⇒ N˜yd = N˜
while for sensor only attacks
Pyd = I = M˜
−1M˜ =⇒ N˜yd = M˜.
Hence, this shows how the unstable zeros of P (which
are the unstable zeros of N˜ ) and the unstable poles of P
(which are the unstable zeros of M˜ ) relate to the actuator
and sensor attacks considered in [5]. Multirate sampling can
potentially remove unstable zeros of N˜yd as it was shown
in [5] for unbounded actuator attacks, but it cannot work for
total sensor unbounded attacks.
In the following we consider the case of bounded in
magnitude (and time) attacks with various levels of stealth.
The question we want to address is how to compute the
worst possible bounded attacks and how to defend against
such attacks by a suitable controller design.
III. COMPUTATION OF WORST ATTACK
We consider the problem of computing the worst case
attack in (1) when the attacker has a finite time window
{0, 1, . . . , ta} to attack the system. In addition, we can
possibly require the attack to remain stealthy after the attack
is over. This allows for repeatedly attacking the system
without triggering monitoring signal alarm.
Specifically, consider the optimization problem in (1).
Assume the LTI closed loop system Φ(K) is stable and
let tψd and tzd be design parameters related to the decay
rate of the pulse responses of of Φzd and Φψd respec-
tively. These parameters determine the time windows that
the attacker cares for impact and stealthiness respectively.
Let td = max(tzd, tψd). Suppose the intruder can only
attack the system during a finite interval {0, 1, . . . , ta}, with
attack magnitude less than or equal to α. Further, assume
that the time window of interest in solving (1) is ta + td,
i.e., the `∞ norms are applied for {z(k)} and {d(k)} with
k = {0, . . . , ta + td}.
The system of equations governing the output z when
subjected to the attack input d for each instance of time
are given by

z(0)
z(1)
...
z(ta)
z(ta + 1)
...
z(ta + tzd)

=

Φzd(0) 0 0 · · ·
Φzd(1) Φzd(0) 0 · · ·
...
...
...
...
Φzd(ta) Φzd(ta − 1) Φzd(ta − 2) · · ·
Φzd(ta + 1) Φzd(ta) Φzd(ta − 1) · · ·
...
...
...
...
Φzd(ta + tzd) Φzd(ta + tzd − 1) Φzd(ta + tzd − 2) · · ·


d(0)
d(1)
...
d(ta)
0
...
0

(2)
where d(k) = 0 for t > ta since the attack time window
belongs to t ∈ {0, . . . , ta}. The objective is to find the
sequence {d(k)}, k = {0, . . . , ta} that maximizes ‖z‖∞
such that ‖ψ‖∞ ≤ θ. This corresponds to selecting the
optimal row in (2) to be maximized and finding the optimal
d that would maximize this row. In view of the above, the
following proposition is obvious.
Proposition 1: Problem (1) can be formulated as the
following optimization problem for finite attack window
t ∈ {0, . . . , ta}:
max
d,n∈{0,1,...,ta+tzd}
n∑
k=0
Φzd(n− k)d(k)
s.t.
∣∣∣ τ∑
k=0
Φψd(τ − k)d(k)
∣∣∣ ≤ θ, τ = 0, 1, . . . , ta + tψd,
|d(k)| ≤ α, k = 0, 1, . . . , ta,
d(k) = 0, k = ta + 1, . . . , ta + td.
(3)
After finding the worst case attack dˆ, the worst case impact
can be obtained by computing
∥∥∥Φzddˆ∥∥∥∞.
Remark 2: The objective function looks for the optimal
row in the set {0, . . . , ta + tzd}. We can always choose a
sufficiently long tzd, determined by the decay rate of Φzd
and the bound α on d, to ensure that we capture the worst
case ‖z‖.
Remark 3: Note that the first set of constraints ensures the
monitoring signal ψ is below a threshold level (‖ψ‖∞ ≤ θ)
during and after the attack interval. Since we assume that
Φψd is stable and that d(k) = 0 for t > ta, if tψd is chosen
long enough, depending on the decay rate of Φψd and the
bound α, one can guarantee that d is undetectable for all t.
Therefore, to guarantee stealthiness for all t it is sufficient to
enforce the monitoring constraints up to ta + tψd. The last
set of constraints ensures the attack is bounded and decays
to zero at the end of the attack interval.
Remark 4: Problem (3) is LP for a fixed n which can be
solved efficiently. Fixing n transforms the objective function
to a linear function under linear (polytopic) constraints.
However, one has to solve (in principle) ta + tzd LPs.
We now provide a simple search algorithm to solve
Problem 3:
Algorithm 1 Compute worst attack dˆ
Input Φzd, Φψd, ta, tzd, tψd, td, θ and α.
for i = 1 : ta + tzd do
Solve
max
di
i∑
k=0
Φzd(i− k)di(k)
s.t.
∣∣∣ τ∑
k=0
Φψd(τ − k)di(k)
∣∣∣ ≤ θ, τ = 0, 1, . . . , ta + tψd,
|di(k)| ≤ α, k = 0, 1, . . . , ta,
di(k) = 0, k = ta + 1, . . . , ta + td.
Compute and store ‖Φzddi‖∞
end
Compare ‖Φzddi‖∞ and determine the worst attack dˆ.
In the sequel, we consider certain cases which simplify
further the computations. Specifically, we consider the prob-
lem of computing the worst case attack when the attacker has
a finite time window k = {0, . . . , ta} to attack the system
such as in Proposition 1. However, in this case we assume
that the intruder does not mind being detected after the attack
is over. The following proposition describes how to construct
the optimal d.
Proposition 5: Consider the optimization Problem in (1)
with tψd = 0. Then, its solution can be obtained by solving
max
d,n∈{ta,...,ta+tzd}
n∑
k=0
Φzd(n− k)d(k)
s.t.
∣∣∣ τ∑
k=0
Φψd(τ − k)d(k)
∣∣∣ ≤ θ, τ = 0, 1, . . . , ta,
|d(k)| ≤ α, k = 0, 1, . . . , ta,
d(k) = 0, k = ta + 1, . . . , ta + tzd.
(4)
Proof: We will prove that the optimal row to be
maximized is in the set {z(ta), . . . , z(ta + tzd)}. Let dˆ be
the worst attack that maximizes µ =: ‖z‖∞ found by solving
for the maximum impact over all the rows of (2) where the
stealthiness constraints are enforced up to t = ta. Assume
that dˆ was found by maximizing any row before z(ta) calling
it row i. Since the stealthiness constraints are imposed only
up to ta and Φ(K) is LTI, we can delay dˆ by ta−i steps (shift
dˆ to the right) so that ‖z‖∞ = µ is achieved by maximizing
the row z(ta) without violating the stealthiness constraints.
In addition, we cannot shift the attack beyond z(ta) since
dˆ(k) = 0 for t > ta. As a result, maximizing ‖z‖∞ for
k = {0, 1, . . . , ta} is equivalent to maximizing ‖z‖∞ for
k = {ta}.
Remark 6: The optimization problem in (4) differs from
the problem in (3) in two ways: First, the stealthiness
constraints set in (4) is a subset of the set in (3), since in
(4) the objective is to remain stealthy only during the attack
interval, where in (3) the stealthiness condition is enforced
at all times. Therefore, the attack designed using Proposition
5 yields worse impact in the `∞ sense than the attacks
designed using Proposition 1. The second difference is in the
objective function where in (3) we have to maximize each
row in (2) to find the worst attack (i.e., ta + tzd LPs), while
in (4) we only need to maximize the last rows associated
with [z(ta), . . . , z(ta + tzd)]′ (i.e., tzd LPs). An immediate
corollary is as follows.
Corollary 7: Let tzd = tψd = 0, i.e., the attacker cares
to inflict maximum damage in the window up to ta while
does not care for stealthiness after ta. Then, the optimal d
is obtained by solving the following LP
max
d
ta∑
k=0
Φzd(ta − k)d(k)
s.t.
∣∣∣ τ∑
k=0
Φψd(τ − k)d(k)
∣∣∣ ≤ θ, τ = 0, 1, . . . , ta,
|d(k)| ≤ α, k = 0, 1, . . . , ta,
(5)
Remark 8: If Φψd is non-minimum phase and α is not
specified, then the optimization problem in Proposition 5 and
Corollary 7 will yield unbounded zero dynamics attacks [5].
IV. CONTROLLER DESIGN FOR RESILIENCY - K-d
ITERATION
In view of the previous discussion, a controller design
procedure can be formulated based on LP. In particular, given
a desired `1 performance level γ for attacks d, find K such
that ‖Φzd(K)‖1 ≤ γ, and to ensure that for a given attack
level characterized by ‖d‖∞ ≤ α, where α is an attack
resource parameter, the “undetected loss” of the closed loop
given by
µα := max
d
‖Φzd(K)d‖∞
s.t. ‖Φψd(K)d‖∞ ≤ θ, ‖d‖∞ ≤ α
remains below a desired level µ. Computing µα for a given
K corresponds to the problem of computing the worst d of
the previous section. A synthesis procedure can be developed
by a “K-d” type of iteration:
• Given Ki with ‖Φzd(Ki)‖ = γi find di from:
µi := max
d
‖Φzd(Ki)d‖∞
s.t. ‖Φψd(Ki)d‖∞ ≤ θ, ‖d‖∞ ≤ α.
• Given di find Ki+1 from:
γi+1 := min
K
‖Φzd(K)‖1 s.t. ‖Φzd(K)di‖∞ ≤ µi
• At each iteration i the problem is a LP with
γi ≤ γi−1 ≤ γ0, µi ≤ γi ‖di‖∞ , ‖di‖∞ ≤ α.
The above formulation guarantees that the upper bound
on the attack impact (i.e. µi) is non-increasing with each
iteration.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We considered the problem of computing worst case
bounded stealthy false data injection attacks for LTI sys-
tems. We considered different attack resource constraints and
stealthiness intervals. This problem involves a maximization
of a convex function subject to convex constraints, and it was
shown that it can be cast as a series of LP problems under
`∞ framework. We provided a search algorithm to solve the
set of LPs. Furthermore, we provided an iterative controller
synthesis procedure that alternates between computing worst
attacks and designing controllers that enhance performance
and minimize the impact of worst attacks.
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